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1. Two versions of aesthetics
Aesthetics might appear to occupy the same position as time in St. Au-
gustine’s Confessions: if no one asks me, I know perfectly well what it 
is, but when asked to define what I really mean by the term, I end up 
in endless contradictions and inconsistencies. Is aesthetics as a philo-
sophical discipline essentially connected to what has come to be the “fine 
arts,” or quite simply “art,” as we would say today? But if so, what kind 
of competence or domain of knowledge does it circumscribe, and how 
does it differ from the specialized discourse on works that we find in 
other disciplines like literary history, art history, etc.? Or is aesthetics a 
theory of something that pertains to certain experiences with a particu-
lar sensory quality, or even to all kinds of objects and situations, perhaps 
due to a process of aestheticizing peculiar to our contemporary societies, 
which would require an analysis of a rather different kind than the one 
normally undertaken in philosophical aesthetics? On another level, we 
might ask if aesthetics is only about surfaces, perhaps even things super-
ficial, as when we say that something is merely aesthetic in order to set 
it against more profound questions of the true and the good. Or is the 
aesthetic in fact more like a relation that exists between us and things, 
and that may neither be ascribed to some objective feature of things nor 
reduced to subjective states, but forms an essential part of intersubjec-
tivity, and thus in a certain sense would be co-implied in all questions of 
truth and goodness?
Morten Kyndrup’s book Den æstetiske relation attempts to clarify 
some of these entangled ideas and to pave the way toward aesthetics 
as a science, or at least provide it with a secure foundation. In order 
to achieve this, he argues, we must dissolve the “marriage” between art 
and aes thetics that has existed at least since German romanticism. Such 
specu lative fusion of art and philosophical reflection, he notes, has in-
deed yielded many remarkable results, but it has also impeded aesthetics 
from becoming a scientific discipline, and also put an exaggerated em-
phasis on art as the producer of some higher truth; today the task would 
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rather be to return to more modest tasks, which also means to place aes-
thetics on a more secure basis.
From a historical point of view, this means a return to a version of aes-
thetics that existed, at least as possibility, from Baumgarten up to Kant, 
and to some extent the book can be read as plea for a kind of Kantian 
analysis that seeks to understand the role of aesthetic judgment in the 
formation of intersubjective communities. Historical models, be it Baum-
garten or Kant, however have no necessary priority, and the focus lies 
on the present. Today, Kyndrup argues, such an aesthetic theory must be 
able to include phenomena like media, design, and various features of our 
everyday life (which was already the case for Kant, for whom artworks in 
many instances were misleading examples if we attempt to understand 
pure judgments of taste). On the other hand it would show that works of 
art in fact contain many features that cannot be understood as “aesthetic,” 
although they would still be essentially connected to their significance 
as art. This squares well with many current “anti-aesthetic” tendencies,1 
especially in the visual arts, which increasingly tend to under stand them-
selves as quasi-cognitive endeavors, drawing on social science, documen-
tary techniques, and various forms of journalism, while the “aesthetic” 
itself seems to have undergone an unprecedented expansion and now 
permeates all of everyday life, from cooking to politics. In short, aesthetic 
issues, and even questions of taste, permeate all aspects of our life, except 
art, where they are often seen as sure signs of superficiality. All of this 
demands a new type of analysis, and Morten Kyndrup’s book is a plea for 
a reformed discipline that would be able to do the job.
II. The marriage between art and aesthetics
Kyndrup provides us with a broad and non-technical outline of the basic 
issues involved, both from a historical and a systematic point of view, and 
in this sense his book could also function as an excellent introduction to 
the study of aesthetics. As a particular philosophical discipline, but pos-
sibly also as a new mode of experience, aesthetics has its roots in the 18th 
century (the word was famously used for the first time in Baumgarten’s 
1735 thesis Reflections on Poetry), and it was the result both of trans-
formations within philosophical discourse and of changes in society at 
large. Modernity, Kyndrup argues, is to a large extent about a process of 
differentiation, out of which autonomous domains or “collective singu-
lars” like aesthetics, but also history, science, and politics, have emerged, 
and he underlines that this is an irreversible development. There is no 
going back to the unity of the true, the good, and the beautiful, first and 
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foremost since such a unity never existed in any other way than as a 
historical myth – and a myth that obviously in itself was oriented to-
ward the future, as in romanticism: the lost unity, of the Greeks, early or 
medieval Christianity, etc., is something that must be retrieved at some 
future moment, and in this sense it already partakes of a proto-modernist 
logic. If this differentiation is also a secularization, and a compartmental-
ization of experience into separate spheres, each with their particular 
mode of rationality, it does not imply that this process proceeds from 
some primordial unity, but that it is a differentiation of differences. In 
short, in aesthetics as well as in all other things, there is no going back, 
and we should stay tuned to the present and that which is emerging, 
which is also the only way for us to uphold a productive instead of an 
antiquarian relation to the past.
As a process of differentiation and secularization, modernity can also 
be understood as a quest for autonomy, or “maturity” (Mündigkeit), as 
Kant says in his essay on the Enlightenment. This autonomy, as it is con-
structed in Kant’s Critiques, is based in the discovery of a subject that 
henceforth will relate only to itself as the source of a set of rationalities, 
which still must transcend any particular perspective. At least two fun-
damental problems are at stake in this “Copernican turn,” first, how to 
mediate between singularity (of empirical existence) and universality (of 
transcendental conditions), and second, how to prevent theoretical and 
practical reason from becoming a mere dualism, i.e. how to account for 
the differentiation as well as the unity of reason. Ever since Kant’s third 
Critique a certain type of aesthetics has been proposed as a possible solu-
tion to both of these questions, i.e. as an experience where the individual 
actualizes that which is spontaneous (judgments of taste) in a medium 
that is also a space of intersubjectivity – the “supersensible stratum” of 
taste, which Kant admits is only an idea, but whose reality, he also notes, 
we ought to bring about – and in this produces a bridge, or a harmony, 
between the strands of theory and practice, nature and freedom. The pro-
ject of a “marriage” between art and philosophical reflection stems from 
this, although Kant himself would undoubtedly have disinherited his 
romantic followers had he been aware of their more full-blown creations 
(his acerbic attacks on the “elevated,” vornehmen, tone in philosophy can 
surely be read in this sense). The so-called Oldest System Program of Ger-
man Idealism from 1796/97 – indisputably in Hegel’s handwriting, al-
though the text has also been attributed to Hölderlin, Schelling, or even 
to other lesser known authors – is one of the first visionary accounts of 
this project, where we can see how traditional academic philosophers, 
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the Buchstabenphilosophen of the past, must learn how to include the 
poet within themselves in order to fuse reason and sensibility in a “new 
mythology,” and how the aesthetic idea becomes the highest idea which 
includes all the others, in a movement that can look back to Plato, as for 
instance Hölderlin explicitly does, and yet acquires a radical new sense 
in a post-Kantian world where subjectivity is at the center.
This was also the moment of the birth of “Art” as a singulare tantum, 
“die Kunst,” as a concept that transcends the system of the arts and 
points toward an experience of the ultimate ground of being, and which 
Schelling was probably the first to propose.2 This was not only a claim 
to autonomy, but perhaps also to what we, following Christoph Menke,3 
could call a theory of sovereignty: art as an event or experience that some-
how legislates over the other spheres. Such a claim was obviously from 
the start a utopian demand or counter-claim, in view of the general pro-
cess of social differentiation that rather tends to entrench art within a 
sphere of particular competence and its concomitant division of labor 
– artists, aestheticians, critics, historians, and the various institutional, 
curatorial, and editorial skills that develop within each of the arts – all 
of which makes art more akin to science. And yet such a promise is what 
underlies many modern conceptions of Art, upheld by artists and phi-
losophers alike, and this connection is what Kyndrup wants to undo. In 
this he follows certain suggestions by Jean-Marie Schaeffer,4 although 
with much more caution and nuance than his predecessor, who tends 
toward sweeping condemnations of modern aesthetic philosophy and 
somewhat populist claims for the role of art, whereas Kyndrup provides 
a more balanced view of the advantages and disadvantages of this coup-
ling – even though, as I would argue, he still accepts its basic premises, 
whereas I think that a case can be made that there is something wrong 
with this story as such. My suspicions have to do both with how it re-
constructs romanticism and how it takes us through the latter parts of 
the 19th century and into early phases of the historical avant-garde; in 
fact, in referring exclusively to a set of canonical philosophical texts, it 
remains just as speculative and negligent of historical detail as those 
“speculative” philosophies of art that it so emphatically criticizes. Even 
though the details of this story are in the end less important to Kyndrup 
than his own constructive proposals for what aesthetics, in his perspec-
tive, could or ought to become, I must still pause a little to reflect on it, 
since it has become a widespread idea.
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III. One of many stories? The problem of polygamy
What, then, was this “marriage,” as Kyndrup aptly calls it – was it based 
on true love, parental coercion, or on mere convenience? In order for 
it to function, both parties have to give the other something valuable, 
and indeed the speculative theory of art made possible a long and rich 
exchange. Through a certain type of philosophical discourse, art was 
endowed with a privileged status, and as unique disclosure of a truth 
that was superior to the truths of everyday life and the sciences it could 
lay claim to a world-constitutive function. This theory unfolds in vari-
ous versions from romanticism through Nietzsche up to Hei degger and 
Adorno, and it has undoubtedly also, at least unconsciously, provided 
at least some avant-garde artists with a source of legitimacy. Inversely, 
the speculative claims of philosophy could pretend to be guided by this 
truth that it first places at one remove from itself, but only in order to 
finally appropriate it and explicate its true meaning, in an act of subtle 
ventriloquy where the one who speaks and the one who listens cease-
lessly exchange places. 
In this way, we could trace the outlines of a vast dialectical drama that 
unfolds from romanticism up to Heidegger and Adorno, where a certain 
idea of Art functions as a mirror that philosophical thought holds up 
to itself, in which it sees its own unity and fulfillment achieved, only in 
a form that yet lacks conceptual reflection, which philosophy is called 
upon to supply. “The true,” Adorno writes in a compressed sentence that 
summarizes the quintessential force of this logic, “is open for discursive 
knowledge, but precisely for this reason the latter does not posses it; the 
kind of knowledge that art is, it also possesses, but as something incom-
mensurable to itself.”5 This chiasm (neatly expressed in the semi colon 
that splits Adorno’s sentence into two reflecting parts) just as much 
embraces a certain “aestheticizing” of philosophy – for instance when 
Adorno claims that philosophy must always refer to the singularity and 
monadic dimension of the work as the “organon of truth,”6 and even that 
Aesthetic Theory is his true prima philosophia – as it implies a becoming-
philosophy of art, when he claims that “truth gradually unfolded in the 
artwork is none other than the philosophical concept,” and that “genuine 
aesthetic experience must become philosophy, otherwise it is nothing.”7 
On the one hand, this sets up a tension that surely can become immense-
ly productive, as in Adorno’s own detailed analyses of musical works, 
but it obviously also entails a risk of reductionism and a violence done 
to the singularity for the work. Kyndrup suggests that there is a certain 
“impotency” in this tradition, and that it somehow fails to approach the 
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individual work of art; I think that the case of Adorno proves this to be 
wrong. It is true that Adorno’s aesthetic would collapse (or at least would 
have to be substantially rethought, as for instance Albrecht Wellmer has 
attempted to do) if the idea of reconciliation would go away; and yet 
this idea would mean little were it not ceaselessly developed out of the 
actual substance of works from Beethoven to Schönberg’s dodecaphony, 
Webern’s serialism and beyond, and it can hardly be argued that Adorno 
would remain indifferent to musical detail or formal analysis, only that 
these empirical features, for him, as a philosopher (and not a musicologist) 
must always be related to a philosophical task.
Now, the story of the speculative theory can undoubtedly be told in 
many ways, and it surely has a great rhetorical efficiency, especially when 
it is contrasted to another form of aesthetics which allegedly stays close to 
the individual works and no longer places on them the exorbitant claim 
that they should somehow save the world from its fragmentation and 
diremption, as in the earlier romantic phase of this story, or inversely, 
as in the later modernist phase, save us from a “reconciliation under du-
ress”8 that cover its differences, and instead discover the non-identity at 
the heart of identity. As soon as one looks closer on individual authors 
and artists, this sharp divide between two ways of conceptualizing aes-
thetics, and above the idea that modern art would somehow be essentially 
determined by it, however begins to look less convincing, and the vast 
difference between thinkers who have been engaged in the “speculative” 
narrative of art must be accounted for. 
There has indeed always been philosophical counter-movements 
within this story, beginning already with Hegel, whose sublation of art 
into philosophy in Kyndrup’s (admittedly brief) presentation looks like a 
continuation of the romantic gesture, but in fact constitutes the sharpest 
conceivable criticism of it. Philosophy, Hegel emphasizes, cannot be 
guided by some ineffable experience of unity contained in the artwork, 
but has to grasp its concept, which also means to supersede it. With re-
spect to its highest determination (the presentation of religious and/or 
philosophical truth), Hegel says, for us, art is a thing of the past, ein Ver-
gangenes, which does not mean that it simply disappears, but rather that 
it is emancipated from metaphysical claims and may engage in precisely 
the kind of sensuous pleasures that many of those who decry the specu-
lative narrative seem to be missing.9 
And beyond Hegel, explicitly opposed to his “aesthetics from above” 
there is a long tradition starting “from below” (as Fechner famously said), 
joining forces with various positivist discourses of science, from optics 
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to physiology, which then fused with the emerging discourse of empa-
thy in transforming the legacy of Kantian idealism by re-interpreting 
it in a psychological fashion. These and many other forms of aesthetic 
theories that took their cue from the sciences were in fact much more 
influential than the alleged “speculative” narrative for the emergence of 
categories like space and tectonics, form and structure, in architecture 
and the vis ual arts, and they became the bedrock of early modernism.10 
Many (though not all) of these movements explicitly rejected the philo-
sophical aesthetics of idealism, whereas we, from our historical vantage 
point, can see that they are inextricably bound to it. Any closer look at the 
role played by aesthetic theories at the turn of the century would, at least 
as I see it, render the question if they simply belonged to a “speculative” 
philos ophy rather pointless: the more interesting task is instead to assess 
the exact hold that this tradition in fact had over early modernism, and 
how it came to be transformed by the encounter with a spectrum of new 
scien tific discourses. In view of this, overarching historical constructions 
like Schaeffer’s are in fact much more speculative than the tradition they 
decry, and they stray much too far from the factual trajectory of aesthetic 
theory to be really useful; instead we should perhaps consider the possi-
bility of promiscuity, or an inherent polygamy, already at the outset of 
the speculative narrative, which has only increased as this history un-
folds through the 19th century and ushers into the various modernisms 
and avant-gardes at the beginning of the 20th century, where alliances 
with sciences and political movements were a determining factor.
Something similar must be said about the artistic evidence for this 
story. Here names and references are even more scarce than in the philo-
sophical tale, but sometimes the claim seems to be made that certain 
types of abstract art (Malevich is cited by Schaeffer as a major piece of 
evidence), and above all conceptual art, would be the outcome of some 
speculative theory of art, and the normal support for the latter claim is 
the singular figure of Joseph Kosuth (to be found both in Schaeffer and 
Kyndrup).11 This curiously disregards the complex dialectic of idealism 
and materialism in painting from impressionism and onward, of which 
Malevich and his generation were acutely aware, and the link becomes 
even more tenuous when it is extended to the 1960s. Apart from the fact 
that Kosuth’s early work in fact grew out of a violent rejection of both 
aesthetics and philosophy – his 1969 manifesto bearing the significant 
title “Art After Philosophy” – the trajectory of conceptual art displays a 
wide array of constellations of particulars and concepts in the wake of 
a long debate on post-painterly abstraction, and it cannot with any art-
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historical accuracy be understood, let alone criticized, as Schaeffer does, 
as a descendent of romantic philosophies of art. 
As we noted above, the proposal that we should dissolve this marriage 
brings us back to Baumgarten, for whom aesthetics was not exclusively 
related to the fine arts, but also had to do with the possibility of sensuous 
cognition, as a mode of knowledge that would somehow preserve the 
individuality of the object, its flavor and fullness, which is supposed to 
have been lost in the speculative theory. The problem with such a return 
is of course that this idea of aesthetics as sensible knowledge has long 
since been integrated into and even become an essential part of the spec-
ulative theory, from Merleau-Ponty to Adorno, Lyotard, and beyond: art 
redeems the sensible, it allows the non-identical to persist in the midst of 
conceptual subsumption, it preserves a touch that precedes naming and 
discourse, and to this extent the distinctions that once presented them-
selves to Baumgarten have been blurred over and over again, if they ever 
were clear in the first place. In short, it remains doubtful whether a re-
turn to discourse of a particular sensuous knowledge in any simple way 
constitutes an alternative to the speculative narrative of modern art.
IV. A happy divorce?
It is true that Kyndrup does not propose that we should return to some-
thing that once existed, and he also displays a healthy distrust toward 
the synthetic and sweeping gestures of someone like Schaeffer, although 
I would argue that he, presumably for reasons of rhetorical efficiency, at 
strategic points appears to accept it. His own proposal is however ori-
ented to our present and to the future, and he suggests that the increas-
ing presence of aesthetic considerations in our everyday life, in design, 
media etc., necessitates a much more concrete approach to the things 
themselves, and this is where the strength of his analysis lies.
Aesthetics, Kyndrup suggests, should be understood in terms of “mod-
eling operations,” i.e., discursive constructions through which certain 
objects become readable as aesthetic, and subject to judgments of taste. 
There is always a “signifying signification” (betydningshandling) that 
must be accounted for and which is what ascribes a certain position, a 
temporality, and a context to the work. 
Aesthetic properties and values are thus neither subjective nor objec-
tive features, but exist in the interrelation between subjects and objects, 
which, as Kyndrup notes, comes close to the phenomenology of aesthetic 
judgment proposed by Kant in the third Critique. The sensus communis 
can in this light be understood as a kind of cultural encyclopedia or a 
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habitus, which can account for the seemingly surprising fact that our 
judgments tend to be fairly similar (at least if we refer to aesthetic prac-
tices that aim directly to produce calculable effect on us, for instance 
design). In this sense, aesthetics describes the process that leads from the 
I to the We of a community that is not necessitated by a concept or a strict 
rationality, but by a kind of feeling that is as it were spontaneous in each 
and every one, or as Kyndrup suggests, a kind of “civilizing” process.
This understanding of aesthetics as a “modeling” operation can also 
shed light on the transformation of the artist from a homo faber to a homo 
significans – if art increasingly appears as disconnected from a set of defin-
able manual practices (with Richard Serra’s famous Verb List as the last 
and no doubt inconclusive attempt to establish a synoptic overview), it is 
because what it deals with is sense or signification, and not a particular type 
of material entities (it is not “territorial” in the physical sense, in Kyndrup’s 
vocabulary). But as he underlines, the fact that anything can be art makes 
it only more obvious that everything is not art, i.e., that the autonomy of 
art is thereby not at all threatened – in fact, it is the seemingly limitless ap-
plicability of the term “art” that makes the institutional framework visible 
as such, whereas earlier stages of the unfolding of autonomy could conceal 
it as somehow “natural” (and in this he largely follows Thierry de Duve’s 
analysis of how Kantian aesthetics not only, seemingly against all odds, 
survives “after Duchamp,” but in fact receives its final confirmation).
Now, one might ask, could this not just as much be understood as a 
continuation of the “marriage” between art and aesthetics? If it is true, as 
Kyndrup says, that “the domain of art in the widest sense of the term re-
mains a primary and exclusive laboratory for the development for strat-
egies and codes of aesthetic relationality – also for possible uses outside 
of art,” (p. 105), could we not in a certain way see this as a completion and 
fulfillment, albeit in a different form, of the promise once made at the out-
set of German idealism? Art as a laboratory where new rationalities and 
relationalities are tested, where a society reflects upon itself, and where 
a certain group of artists, critics, theorists etc., are allowed to loosen and 
even wholly reject the strictures of everyday instrumental rationality, 
although within an institutional framework that both elevates and neu-
tralizes the particular claims made inside the institution? And if this is 
autonomy perfected, the fully developed institution art, would then in 
fact the premature analysis of the historical avant-garde proposed by 
Peter Bürger be applicable precisely to our own present?
The divorce between art and aesthetics recommended by Morten 
Kynd rup might then in the end turn out to be an unhappy one where 
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both parts would feel certain dissatisfaction, precisely because it seals 
both of them in a space where their respective freedom is bought at 
the expense of a sense of impotency. If there is a kind of “malaise dans 
l’esthétique,” as Jacques Rancière suggests (paraphrasing the standard 
French translation of Freud’s Das Unbehagen in der Kultur), it might 
consist precisely in this: that aesthetics becomes a science, with its own 
method, but severed from the radical transformative potentials that re-
sulted from the love relationship that it once had with art and the avant-
garde. Morten Kyndrup’s short, lucid, and thought-provoking book poses 
all of these questions, directly or indirectly, and it points to the potentials 
of the discipline, perhaps not by making us decide between marriage and 
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